(1943). The scope of the desegregation order was also upheld against all the State's objections, id., at 1301-1307, as was the allocation of costs, id., at 1307-1308. to Pet. . There is no allegation here, nor could there be, that the neutral tax limitations imposed by the people of Missouri are unconstitutional. Footnote 18 14. The District Court's remedial plan was proposed for the most part by the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) itself, which is in name a defendant in the suit. 535, and fails to take account of local governments' obligations, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. 2. Here, the KCMSD may be ordered to levy taxes despite the statutory limitations on its authority in order to compel the discharge of an obligation imposed on KCMSD by the Fourteenth Amendment. . 489-502. With him on the brief for respondents Kalima Jenkins et al. Opinion Announcement - June 12, 1995. The State's argument that the funding ordered by the District Court violates the principles of equity and comity because the remedial order itself was excessive aims at the scope of the remedy, rather than the manner in which the remedy is to be funded, and thus falls outside this Court's limited grant of certiorari. See Mo. to Pet. Contact us. The District Court then held that the State and KCMSD were 75% and 25% at fault, respectively, and ordered them to share the cost of the desegregation remedy in that proportion. The Court is unanimous in its holding, that the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming "the actions that the [district] court has taken to this point," 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (CA8 1988), must be reversed. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri imposed an increase in the property taxes levied by the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) to ensure funding for the desegregation of KCMSD's public schools. 138-142. 1983, on which respondents' complaint is based, is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of the remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the equitable power of the District Court. U.S. 33, 77] U.S. 124, 161 The District Court believed that it had no alternative to imposing a tax increase. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. (1964). The State's filing on its face did not exactly comport with any of these options. U.S. 33, 78]. Programs such as a "performing arts middle school," id., at 118a, a "technical magnet high school" that "will offer programs ranging from heating and air conditioning to cosmetology to robotics," id., at 75a, were approved. U.S. 33, 55]. million in capital improvement bonds. court's judgment, pending the court's further determination whether the judgment should be modified so as to alter its adjudication of the rights of the parties." The District Court in this case found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that there was no interdistrict constitutional violation that would support mandatory interdistrict relief. 78, p. 523 (J. Cooke ed. Footnote 9 The court issued an order detailing a desegregation remedy and the financing necessary to implement it. We accept, without approving or disapproving, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court's remedy was proper. A federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury. The plan involved a variation of the magnet school concept. I, 10, cl. . X, 11(b),(c). Ibid. The District Court rejected a request by the KCMSD to increase the property tax rate using the method endorsed by the Eighth Circuit from $4 to $4.23 per $100 of assessed valuation. I am required in light of our limited grant of certiorari to assume that the remedy chosen by the District Court was a permissible exercise of its remedial discretion. It also approved the District Court's "implicit" rejection of the State's request for a determination of partial unitary status. We stand on different ground when we review the modifications to the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals. ] KCMSD was ordered to improve the quality of the curriculum and library, reduce teaching load, and implement tutoring, summer school, and child development programs. Oct 30, 1989. First, in 1989, to address attorneys fees. The text Jenkins III is included below as background. The remedy must therefore be related to the condition alleged to offend the Constitution. Whatever the merits of this argument when applied to the District Court's own order increasing taxes, a point we have not reached, see supra, at 53, a court order directing a local government body to levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal court. App. The State has argued here that the District Court, having found the State and KCMSD jointly and severally liable, should have allowed any monetary obligations that KCMSD [495 U.S. 33, 43], Although the Court of Appeals thus "affirm[ed] the actions that the [District] [C]ourt has taken to this point," id., at 1314, it agreed with the State that principles of federal/state comity required the District Court to use "minimally obtrusive methods to remedy constitutional violations." See 855 F.2d, at 1314. 493 The goals of court remediation of school segregation is to restore victims of discrimination to the position they would have been in but for the discrimination, and to eventually restore school control to the state and local authorities. (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). U.S., at 293 Fed. TermsPrivacyDisclaimerCookiesDo Not Sell My Information, Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select, Stay up-to-date with FindLaw's newsletter for legal professionals. However, over the 18-year span of the case, the court ordered remedies that were focused instead on improving educational facilities and programs inside KCMSD.[1]. The goals of the plan were to attract nonminority students to the school district and to provide the minority students in the district an equivalent education to one absent the effects of segregation. 1341, as the injunction would require the collection of additional taxes, not inhibit the collection of taxes. As the State puts it, "[t]he only reason that the court below needed to consider an unprecedented tax increase was the equally unprecedented cost of its remedial programs." denied, The Court of Appeals' judgment was entered on August 19, 1988. By this I do not mean that the remedy is, as we assume this one was, within the broad discretion of the district court. Griffin followed a long and venerable line of cases in which this Court held that federal courts could issue the writ of mandamus to compel local governmental bodies to levy taxes adequate to satisfy their debt obligations. The Court of Appeals observed that the increases were designed to eliminate the vestiges of state-imposed segregation by improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the district and by reversing "white flight" to the suburbs. Id., at 470-488. The district court then instead named the KCMSD school district as a defendant. 449 Relevant to the present case, the District Court ordered the State to pay for (i) salary increases to teachers and other employees in the KCMSD, and (ii) the continuation of remedial quality education programs. Milliken v. Bradley, 19 (1985). 1987). Ill-considered entry into the volatile field of taxation is a step that may place at risk the legitimacy that justifies judicial independence. . No cost was placed on the interdistrict transfer program, but the State was ordered to underwrite the program in full. The principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined by the violation means simply that federal-court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself. trict / distrikt/ n. School Dist. of Estimate v. Morris, 433 As long as the state is not interfering on the basis of race, the courts should step aside. On January 10, 1989, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals issued an amended order, recalling the October 14 mandate and entering nunc pro tunc, effective October 14, an order denying the three "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc." Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer. 51, p. 352 (J. Cooke ed. The premise of the Court's analysis, I submit, is infirm. This reflects the Framers' understanding that taxation was not a proper area for judicial involvement. U.S. 212, 215 The plan was intended to "improve the quality of education of all KCMSD students." But it is misleading to suggest that a failure to fund this particular remedy would leave constitutional rights without a remedy. of Education, Defendants, and above all defendants that are public entities, act in the highest and best tradition of our legal system when they acknowledge fault and cooperate to suggest remedies. One of the would-be intervenors filed with this Court an application for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari 78 days after the issuance of the order denying rehearing and 134 days after the entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment. "The Fourteenth Amendment . 376 (1861). 1651, 1666, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990), another case involving school desegregation, the Court held, "Even though a particular remedy may not be required in every case to vindicate constitutional guarantees, where (as here) it has been found that a particular remedy is required, the State cannot hinder the process by preventing a local government . v. Rodriguez. An initial finding of discrimination cannot be used as the basis for a wholesale shift of authority over day-to-day school operations from parents, teachers, and elected officials to an unaccountable district judge whose province is law, not education. Zimmern v. United States, In Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57, 110 S.Ct. 855 F.2d, at 1314. MISSOURI v. JENKINS (1990) No. Since then, the total cost of capital improvements ordered has soared to over $540 million. U.S. 711, 720 . In November 1986, the District Court endorsed a marked expansion of the magnet school program. Though the matter is not without difficulty, we conclude that the State has the better of the argument. (1881); United States v. New Orleans, Even though a particular remedy may not be required in every case to vindicate constitutional guarantees, where (as here) it has been found that a particular remedy is required, the State cannot hinder the Under Missouri law, the KCMSD has power to impose a limited property tax levy up to $1.25 per $100 of assessed value. In 1987, the district courts ordered mandatory salary assistance, arguing that to end segregation in the schools the district needed higher-paid, quality teachers. 705 (1867) (mandamus to state officials to collect a tax authorized by state law Our cases throughout the years leave no doubt that taxation is not a judicial function. mandat[ed] a particular method or structure of state or local financing." There is no showing in this record that, faced with the revenue shortfall, the District Court gave due consideration to the possibility that another remedy among the "wide range of possibilities" would have addressed the constitutional violations without giving rise to a funding crisis. The State filed a petition for certiorari within 90 days of the October 14, 1988, order, which was granted, limited to the question of the property tax increase. [ Rule 41(a) requires the mandate of the Court of Appeals to issue "21 days after the entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order," but provides that a timely petition for panel rehearing "will stay the mandate until disposition of the petition unless otherwise ordered by the court." In such cases, of which Pink was one, "no . App. of Treasury, 349 To the contrary, 1983 is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of a remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the District Court's equitable powers. . Other Circuits that have faced funding problems arising from remedial decrees have concluded that, while courts have undoubted power to order that schools operate in compliance with the Constitution, the manner and methods of school financing are beyond federal judicial authority. Griffin endorsed the power of a federal court to order the local authority to exercise existing authority to tax. See also FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and IV, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. See National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565 (CA6 1977); Plaquemines Parish School Bd. to Pet. 400, 408 (WD Mo. (1971). . 672 F. Supp. U.S. 170 Although this Court of Appeals may not on every occasion have observed these technicalities, it cannot be concluded that the court has engaged in a systematic practice of ignoring them. The fact that a school is predominately black is not an indication of intentional, unconstitutional segregation. A group of local taxpayers (Clark Group) and Jackson County, Missouri, also appealed from an order of the District Court denying their applications to intervene as of right. This direction indicates that the District Court understood that it was now obliged to allow KCMSD to set the tax levy itself. The truth of the matter is that the remedies in those cases were permissible choices among the many that might be adopted by a district court. These cases hold that where there is no state or municipal taxation authority that the federal court may by mandamus command the officials to exercise, the court is itself without authority to order taxation. Hubert v. Mayor and Council of New Orleans, Missouri argued that these orders went beyond the court's authority. Especially where those institutions are ready, willing, and - but for the operation of state law curtailing their powers - able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights themselves. 2d 229 (1989) Parties: Benson and The NAACAP Legal Defense and Educational Fund & The State of Missouri Issue: 1. (Rehnquist, C.J.) Mo. In other words, the State argues that federal courts cannot set aside state-imposed limitations on local taxing authority because to do so is to do more than to require the local government "to exercise the power that is theirs." Abood v. Detroit Bd. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed those orders. The District Court believed that it had the power to order a tax increase to ensure adequate funding of the desegregation plan, but it hesitated to take this step.
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